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ABSTRACT
The Distribution Grid across the world has been undergoing profound changes over the
past decade. In developed nations, electrification of the transportation sector and integra-
tion of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) has finally gained momentum. In emerging
markets, electrification of rural areas brings to light the question of whether a ’centralized
bulk transmission’ based solution would be the best fit. These ideas have only come under
consideration primarily due to great strides in technological advancement coupled with the
reduction in costs of such technologies. However, this massive transformation in the physical
and technological aspects of the grid could directly conflict with existing business models
and pricing strategies applied to the customers.
The main objective of this work is to propose a system where the implementation of
these grid-edge technologies is in the interest of all parties involved in the energy ecosystem
- utilities, retail energy providers, and the end-users. This proposed restructure of the utility
business model is based on a shift in philosophy, from treating electricity as a commodity
where the users are charged based on their volumetric consumption, to treating it as a service
provided to the end-user by the utility company for a fixed customer-specific Grid Access
Fee. It is designed for a deregulated wholesale and retail electricity market setting, like in
Texas. This mechanism calculates the ’impact’ of a customer on the distribution grid by
evaluating the customer on metrics that contribute directly to the costs incurred by the
utility companies.
Upon testing the new rate calculation mechanism against the old, it is observed that
the distribution of bills for end-users is less centered around the mean, indicating that there
are a few ’heavy-weight’ customers who cause the most impact to the grid, and some of the
’light-weight’ customers are overpaying in the existing scheme. Under the new scheme, the
impact of customers on the grid is now more directly linked to the bill of that customer,
ii
thus aligning the customer’s incentives with that of the utility. The potential for additional
human-centered grid services has also been illustrated.
iii
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NOMENCLATURE
DER Distributed Energy Resource
IoT Internet of Things
REP Retail Energy Provider
TDU Transmission Delivery Utility
EV Electric Vehicle
PV Photo Voltaic Cell
kWh kilo Watt hour
kW kilo Watt
BTM Behind-The-Meter
GW Giga Watt
US United States
NSF National Science Foundation
LRAM Lost Revenue Adjustment Mechanism
ROI Return on Investment
W Demand Magnitude Impact Factor
V Demand Variability Impact Factor
µ Peak Demand Indicator Function
λ Peak Variability Indicator Function
§t Total System Demand at time t
βt Total System Variability at time t
SPeakTh System Demand Peak Threshold
βPeakTh System Variability Peak Threshold
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X ti Demand of user i at time t
dX ti Variability of user i at time t
ΠW Allocation Percentage of total target revenue for W
ΠV Allocation Percentage of total target revenue for V
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Grid Edge Revolution
The Grid Edge can be defined as technologies, solutions, and business models advancing
the transition towards a decentralized, distributed, and transactive grid. [1]
The Grid-Edge and DER Revolution is not just a prediction; this is happening right under
our noses. Behind-The-Meter (BTM) Technologies are touted to make up over 50% of the
US Market by 2021, with energy storage estimated to hit 2 GW by then [2]. Despite the fact
that end-use demand is projected to increase in the next few decades both in the residential
and commercial levels, there is a significant projected reduction in energy intensity [3]. This,
coupled with the rise of demand-side power generation through rooftop solar PV and other
DERs, implies that large-scale investments in bulk power generation units and transmission
infrastructure will be significantly lower than in the past few decades.
Figure 1.1: The Effect of EV Penetration in the Distribution Grid
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The figure represents the market’s trend towards how technology and innovation is hap-
pening more at the edge, i.e. the user-end, rather than at the centralized level, whereas
analytics is centralized, with the rise of cloud-based services.
1.1.1 Major Drivers for the Grid-Edge Revolution
The key contributors to the rise of the grid edge are:
1. The rise of the prosumer [4]
2. New Technologies at the Customer End (IoT)
3. Electrification of the Transportation Industry (EVs)
4. Generation at the Customer End (DERs)
5. Cost-competitive storage at the customer end
6. Emphasis on the Resiliency of the Grid
7. Lack of Strong Incentives to install Transmission Lines and Bulk Power Plants
1.2 Challenges Faced by the Distribution Grid
1.2.1 Factors Contributing to Utility Expenditure
Spending on electricity distribution systems by major US Utilities has risen from $31
billion to $51 billion annually [3]. This has been largely driven by capital investment. Op-
erations and maintenance expenses have also increased as electric distribution systems ex-
perience stress from several factors, including more customers and variable generation. The
increasing amounts of customer-sited variable generation increases wear & tear on the distri-
bution equipment required to maintain voltage and frequency within acceptable limits and
to manage excessive heating of transformers during reverse power flow.
The key drivers for utility expenditure are [5]:
1. The total number of customers served
2
2. Customer Demand Curve
3. System Peak Load
4. Infrastructure Capital Investment & Maintenance Costs (Transformers, lines, protec-
tion & Switchgear)
1.2.2 Effect of Electric Vehicles
With increasing penetration of electric vehicles year by year, there is a critical need
for distribution grid reinforcement, with additional system capacity installation seeming
inevitable [6].
The figure depicts a sample distribution system on which the effect of EV Penetration has
been simulated. In the distribution level, the charging infrastructure seems to be a massive
contributor to a marked increase in system capacity requirements. This figure was created
using Level-II Charging data profiles for 200 homes. [7]
If these charging profiles are uncoordinated, the distribution grid becomes overloaded at
an EV penetration level as low as 30%. This is cause for serious concern, because to continue
reliable supply of power, distribution utilities will incur heavy capital investment costs to
raise the maximum system capacity limit. The costs trickle down to the customers, and that
is undesirable, because not all customers are contributing to this increase in demand.
1.2.3 Effect of Solar PVs
As the penetration of Solar PV increases, distribution utilities are finding it extremely
difficult to cope, due to the inherent unpredictability and intermittency of solar PV gen-
eration. The duck curve has truly impacted the grid in the sense that sudden ramping of
power demand from the grid as the sun goes down creates a need for ’dirty’ power plants,
while also causing severe stress to the transmission and distribution infrastructure, thereby
reducing the lifetimes of the equipment. With all these detrimental effects, the true killer
is the fact that such customers who own Solar PV panels end up paying a significantly less
monthly bill compared to the regular customer who does not cause such impacts on the grid,
3
Figure 1.2: The Effect of EV Penetration in the Distribution Grid
due to flawed schemes such as net-metering [8], or by virtue of the fact that the customer
demands a net total less power from the grid [9].
1.3 Human-Centered Electricity Services
When the term human factors is used in the context of engineering, it is generally con-
sidered as the application of knowledge and principles concerning human physiology and
psychology to the design of specific hardware and software systems or components. In the
arena of energy consumption research, human factors has not usually been defined in this
way, but instead in a broader conception of the human dimensions of energy use. Re-
searchers in the past [10] have identified seven domains of human factors in energy analysis:
4
(1) variability of behavior and energy use, (2) public opinion and attitudes, (3) effects of
information and financial incentives, (4) social aspects of pricing, (5) energy use as a social
process, (6) microbehavior in consumption environments, and (7) macro-social patterning of
consumption.
In this work, the major themes focus on (1), (6) and (7), and the potential for (3) is also
illustrated.
1.3.1 Participation in the NSF I-Corps
As part of a National Science Foundation workshop "NSF I-Corps" [11], I was part of a
team that explored the commercial market potential of a Human-Centered Electricity Ser-
vices startup, GridGuru1. Through the experience of the NSF I-Corps, I had the opportunity
to interact with a wide spectrum of people, right from system operators, utility companies,
retail energy providers, regulators, and several end-users, gaining insight about the problems
faced by each of these members of the energy ecosystem, and what could potentially solve
these. This thesis is based on some of these learnings.
1.4 Previous Work on Utility Business Models
With sea change in the utility industry, Several studies have been conducted to examine
the effect of regulatory, technological, economic, and other aspects of high DER penetra-
tion in the future of the distribution grid. [12] and [13] explore the regulatory framework
in different parts of the world, and the restructuring that may be required to enable an
accelerated transformation towards grid modernization, while [14] argues that the existing
regulatory measures may be adequate to accommodate even a transformed future. Techno-
logical innovations and Behind-the-Meter technologies have had a transformational effect in
the utility industry. The resulting need for utilities to revolutionize their business practices,
and a rebalancing of costs on the electricity value chain from the grid side to behind the
meter have been discussed in [15] and [16] respectively.
1GridGuru is a residential electric plan selection and demand response platform
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[17] is one of the most important and comprehensive works on reviewing the various types
of business models that utilities can adopt. In [18], a Distribution Network Use-of-System
(DNUoS) charge has been proposed, which aids in accurate recovery of distribution utility
costs, by capturing the contribution of each user on the network to the system’s costs. This
idea of billing network members for their contribution to system costs has been applied in
this thesis.
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2. THE EXISTING UTILITY BUSINESS MODEL - PREVENTING INNOVATION?
2.1 The Deregulated Electricity Market
In the context of this work, a deregulated electricity market structure has been considered
[19]. In this structure, there are two transactions - the physical transaction, representing
the flow of electrons (electric power), and the financial transaction, representing the flow of
money.
Figure 2.1: The Deregulated Electricity Market Structure
Our primary focus in this work is the Physical transaction, i.e. the flow of power from
generation units to the customers through the transmission and distribution infrastructure
owned by the Transmission and Distribution Utility (TDU).
2.2 Understanding the Customer’s Bill
As an illustrative example, let us consider a sample electricity plan provided by Reliant
Energy [20]. The electric bill for customers is divided into two categories:
1. TDU Delivery Charges - The objective of this fee is to recover the operation &
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maintenance costs, and the capital investments made by the utilities to upgrade or
expand their infrastructure.
2. Energy Charges - charged by the Retail Energy Provider. This essentially exists to
recover the costs incurred by the generator and the Retail Energy Providers.
Figure 2.2: A Sample Electricity Facts Label
Let us take a closer look at the TDU Charges.
The existing TDU Charges are fashioned as a combination of a small fixed charge, coupled
with a larger volumetric ¢/kWh charge. Thus, the customer’s TDU Charges increase with
an increase in total power consumed by that customer from the grid. This volumetric charge
could be flat, vary based on consumption thresholds (tiered pricing), or have varied rates
based on time of consumption. The relative distribution of the fixed part vs volumetric part
varies by region and from customer to customer, but the current scenario largely features the
fixed charges accounting for a significantly less percentage of the total bill than volumetric
charges. The TDU Charges are akin to a toll fee for using the TDUs grid infrastructure.
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Figure 2.3: Typical Utility Bill Cost Curve - More the Volumetric Throughput, Higher the
Utility Revenue
2.3 The Volumetric Throughput Incentive of Utility Companies
With the present scenario of a small fixed charge coupled with a larger variable charge
based on volumetric kWh consumption, it seems clear that the revenue earned by utilities is
directly proportional to the volume of electricity in kWh that flows through their distribution
network. This clearly incentivizes utilities to maximize sales and try having more power
flow through their distribution network. In this manner, the utilities can increase their
revenues, thus recovering their costs and maximizing their profits. This is detrimental to
the aforementioned objective of grid modernization: to make the grid more clean, reliable,
resilient, and efficient.
The Grid Edge Revolution thus poses a severe threat to utility companies that continue
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to operate under the older outdated business practices in the modern day. As discussed
earlier, Solar PV penetration directly results in reduction of kWh demand from the grid-
center, thus reducing the customer’s utility bill, even though the utility company offers the
service of access to the grid at all times, without which the customer will not survive when
the sun goes down.
The utility company has several responsibilities that need to be met to ensure the cus-
tomers’ lights remain turned on - operation & maintenance of devices, system planning &
scheduling, and most importantly ensuring that the transmission and distribution network
has enough capacity to actually deliver the power from the generators to the customers.
2.4 Desirable Characteristics of the New Rate Structure
1. Must Capture the true causes of costs for distribution utilities
2. Equitable Allocation of Costs to each customer
3. Rigorous methodology (Precise, Data-Driven)
4. Simple for the Customer
2.5 Eliminating the Conflict of Interest
There is thus a dire need to restructure the utility business model, so as to better align
with the aforementioned objectives of a Grid Edge Future.
Essentially, the distribution utility needs to find alternate approaches to recover their
fixed costs [21]. Some key ideas touted to achieve these objectives include - increase in fixed
charges, introduction of minimum bills, demand charges, revenue decoupling, time-varying
rates, tiered pricing, or lost revenue adjustment mechanisms (LRAMs).
It seems clear that an increase in fixed charges levied on customers would be a much
better way to assure utilities of a certain level of revenue without the detrimental effect
of the throughput incentive. However, this raises the concern that with lower volumetric
charges, consumers would lose their incentive to minimize their usage; furthermore, their
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prior investments into usage minimization & energy efficiency, including star-rated appliances
and even rooftop solar PV would now have a much longer payback/ROI period. Another
key issue about increased fixed charges across all customers is the lack of equitable collection
from all users - the policy would disproportionately impact low-usage consumers.
The goal here is now to design a rate such that it captures the true cost incurred by the
distribution utility to service a certain customer. Essentially, the rate must be reflective of
the customer’s actual impact on the grid.
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3. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
Following this, a new TDU Rate Calculation Mechanism has been proposed. Let us look
into this in more detail.
Figure 3.1: Old vs. New TDU Charges : Cost Curve
Cost ($) vs Consumption (kWh)
The new TDU Charge features the introduction of a fixed grid-access fee, which would
completely replace the traditional small fixed + large volumetric structuring of utility pricing.
The unique flavor of this idea lies in how these grid-access fees would be customer-specific,
calculated for each customer by taking into account some key parameters that define the
impact of said customer on the grid. This impact is quantified through a combination of
weighting factors called Grid Impact Factors.
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This concept is analogous to that of an insurance rates model or a credit score, where
each customers rates/credit limit are appropriately scaled to accurately reflect the risk level
taken up by the insurance company / bank by entering into business with said customer.
3.1 Shapley Value
The Shapley Value is a means of evaluating a game, by measuring the value of each
player in the game. [22] It is a solution concept in cooperative game theory, where to each
cooperative game it assigns a unique distribution (among the players) corresponding to their
respective contribution to the overall value of the group.
3.1.1 Formal Definition
Coalitional Game: There is a set N (of n players) and a function ν, such that ν : 2N →
R with ν(∅) = 0, where ∅ denotes the empty set. ν is called a characteristic function, with
the following meaning: if S is a coalition of players, then v(S), called the worth of coalition
S, describes the total expected sum of payoffs the members of S can obtain by cooperation.
The Shapley Value is one way to distribute the total gains to the players. It has several
desirable properties (listed below), making it a "fair" distribution.
The Shapley value (φi) for network i is obtained by:
1
N !
∑
pi∈Π
(ν(S(pi, i)− ν(S(pi, i) \ i))
where ν is the cost function, Π is the set of all possible permutations of players N and S(pi, i)
is the set of all players in ordering pi without i and including i.
3.1.2 Properties of Shapley Value
1. Symmetry or Equal Treatment: If two players in a game are substitutes (i.e. the
worth of no coalition changes when replacing one of the two players by the other one),
then their values are equal.
2. Null or Dummy Player: If a player in a game is such that the worth of a coalition
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never changes when he joins it, then his value is zero.
3. Efficiency or Pareto Optimality: The sum of the values of all players equals ν(N),
the worth of the grand coalition of all players (in a superadditive game ν(N) is the
maximal amount that the players can jointly get; this property actually combines
feasibility with efficiency).
4. Additivity: The value of the sum of two games is the sum of the values of the two
games
These properties uniquely determine one payoff vector for each game. The Shapley value
of a player i in a game v turns out to be exactly the expected marginal contribution of player
i to a random coalition S.
3.2 Shapley Value Approximation for Calculating Impact on the Grid Due to
each Home i
The approach of applying a Shapley Value Approximation to calculate Grid Impact
Factors is analogous to the methodology followed in [23], which dealt with bill calculation
schemes for Internet Traffic.
In the context of a Distribution Grid, the Installed Capacity of the system is a key
parameter - it determines how much load can be served to the customers, and depending
on changing load patterns, this limit also dictates the need for capital investment. System
Capacity requirements are directly dependent on the System Peak Demand to be supplied to
the customers at any given time t. Thus, the "Peak Demand Time Slots" are a critical time
for the system. Thus, a Demand Magnitude Impact Factor W is introduced, that measures
the demand impact weight of each home during the peak demand time slots.
Demand Impact Weight of Home i (Wi) = Total Demand of Home i during Peak Slots
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Another key concern for the distribution grid is the health of the existing infrastructure.
This directly impacts the capital investment and maintenance costs that the utility incurs.
The health of grid infrastructure is correlated to its loading conditions and the fluctuations
in demand. These fluctuations are measured in the Demand Variability Impact Factor V ,
during the peak variability time slots of each home.
Variability Impact Weight of Home i (Vi) = Total Variability of Home i during Peak Slots
Following these, the allocated costs for each home are given as follows:
Cost Allocation of Home i = Impact Weight of Home iSum of Weights for all Homes
As is evident from the figure, the utility company in the past did not have their revenue
under their control, i.e. they would have to watch and hope that consumers use more kWh,
thus driving up their revenue. But now, the utility has a steady and assured income from
each consumer via the fixed Grid Access Fees. In the figure, Customer 2 has a lower impact
than Customer 1, and thus is charged a lower Grid Access Fee.
3.3 Peak Indicator Functions
With the objective of making the rate structure as flexible and general as possible, the
idea of Peak Indicator Functions for Demand and Variability has been introduced. These
take as inputs the present system conditions, the peak threshold for the system conditions,
and a strictness parameter k, to deliver an output of an indication whether the system
condition at that time t is considered to be a peak slot or not. When k is very small, the
Peak Threshold is considered a very strict cut-off, whereas if k is larger, the function also
begins to consider those time slots where St is almost equal to the peak threshold, thus
reducing the importance and emphasis placed on an inherently arbitrary definition of peak
threshold.
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Peak Indicator Functions have been defined for Peak Demand Magnitude (S) and Peak
Demand Variability (β) as µ and λ respectively. These are described below.
3.3.1 Peak Demand Magnitude Indicator µ
This function is designed similar to a logistic function, and is centered around the System
Peak Threshold value SPeakTh. SPeakTh is calculated based on a percentile value that can be
set by the distribution grid operator. If the peak threshold percentage is set as 15%, then
SPeakTh = 85
th percentile of System curve S. This means that a given time slot t is defined
as a peak demand time slot when St ≥ SPeakTh. In essence, this function returns 1 if it is a
peak slot, and 0 if not. For a given time t, µ is described as follows:
µt =
1
1 + e
−(St−SPeakTh)
k
Figure 3.2: Peak Demand Magnitude Indicator Function µ
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3.3.2 Peak Demand Variability Indicator λ
The Variability indicator has the additional unique property of not only indicating that
a given slot is a peak slot, but also capturing how big the peak is.
Similar to SPeakTh, βPeakTh is calculated based on a percentile value that can be set by
the distribution grid operator. A given time slot t is defined as a peak variability time slot
when βt ≥ βPeakTh. For a given time t, λ is defined as follows:
λt = k ln(1 + e
(βt−βPeakTh)
k )
Figure 3.3: Peak Demand Variability Indicator Function λ
3.4 Calculating the Grid Impact Factors W and V
Let X ti = Demand of user i at time t
dX ti = Change in Demand of user i between time t and t− 1
i.e. dX ti = X ti −X t−1i
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3.4.1 Element-Wise Multiplication
W ti = X
t
i · µt
W ti =
∑
t
W ti
V ti = dX
t
i · λt
V ti =
∑
t
V ti
3.4.2 Matrix Multiplication
WN×1 = XN×T · µT×1
N homes, T timesteps
VN×1 = dXN×(T−1) · λ(T−1)×1
N homes, (T − 1) time differences
3.4.3 Relative Weight (% Allocation) for each Home i
Wshare i =
Wi∑N
j=1Wj
Vshare i =
Vi∑N
j=1 Vj
3.5 Calculating the Final Bills
Let Boldi total → Total Bill of home i calculated in the old method,
and Bnewi total → Total Bill of home i calculated in the new method.
The data used is for a period of 2 years, i.e. 24 months. To calculate bills for each home
under the old mechanism, we consider a standard rate formula for TDU Charges defined as
follows:
Boldi total =
24∑
mo=1
($5 + 0.05× kWhmoi )
In the new rate calculation mechanism, customers are charged a fixed monthly bill based
on their Grid Impact Factors. This fixed charge is calculated by starting from the total target
revenue for the utility company. This is the reverse approach of the existing mechanism, thus
a stark difference from the procedure followed in the traditional scheme, where the individual
customer’s rate is based on a fixed formula, and an aggregation of all customers’ payments
gives the total revenue for the utility company.
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To make a fair comparison of both the mechanisms, the total revenue for the utility
company has been fixed as the Boldi total value, i.e.,
N∑
i=1
Boldi total =
N∑
i=1
Bnewi total
Since the new mechanism has to account for two contributing grid impact factors W and
V , the importance of these respective weighting factors are determined by the allocation
percentage parameters ΠV and ΠW , defined as follows:
ΠW = % Allocation of Total Target Revenue for W
ΠV = % Allocation of Total Target Revenue for V
And so, finally, the total bill for each home i as per the new scheme is calculated as a
linear combination of the weighting factors scaled with their respective allocation percentage
parameters, as follows:
Bnewi total = Wshare i × ΠW + Vshare i × ΠV
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4. EXPERIMENTAL TESTING AND RESULTS
4.1 About the Data
The data used for the subsequent results in this work is the instantaneous kW Demand for
200 residential customers, measured at a resolution of 1-minute. The dataset was obtained
from Pecan Street Dataport [24], with the slice of the data used being for a period of two
years (01-01-2016 to 12-31-2017).
4.2 System Demand and Variability
The first step is to assess the system demand and system variability, with those being the
key metrics based on which the new rate calculation mechanism is computed. A drawback of
computing SPeakTh and βPeakTh across all time periods is that due to the inherent seasonality
of the electric power system demand patterns, the ’peak’ St values would consider only the
time slots in summer months (the typical peak consumption period in ERCOT) as "peak
demand time slots". This would essentially mean that the algorithm treats consumption
during other months as negligible, which is quite inaccurate. To counter this issue, the
system peak functions SPeakTh and βPeakTh are calculated on a monthly basis, as shown in
Figure 4.1 (red trace).
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Figure 4.1: Total System Demand and Variability Curves
4.3 Percentage Change of Customer Bill due to the New Mechanism
This is a key metric based on which the performance of the new mechanism can be
described. Here, the percentage change of the customer bill is defined as follows:
%Change of Customer Bill = B
new
i total −Boldi total
Boldi total
× 100%
As is evident from Figure 4.2, there are a significant number of ’winners’ (negative % change
→ savings in the new scheme) and ’losers’ (positive % change → additional expenses in the
new scheme).
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Figure 4.2: Percentage Change in Cost Allocation for each Home
4.4 Relationship between % Change and Old Bill
To check if any patterns can be identified, we explore the relationship between the change
in percentage allocation of cost and the previous customer bill. In Figure 4.3, for a given
value of the X-Axis, there are multiple Y-axis points falling on the spectrum of positive as
well as negative. This indicates that the new bill is being computed on a totally different
metric, not correlated to the old bill. Since the X-Axis refers to what the old bill was for
these customers, let us examine why the bills for some are more, and others are less than
the old bill, i.e. why some are ’winners’ and others are ’losers. We compare two such points,
that have been marked in red.
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Figure 4.3: Relationship between Change in Percentage Allocation of Cost and the Previous
Bill of the Customer
4.5 Winners and Losers in the New Scheme
In the Figure 4.4 (top), the system demand curve has been plotted along with the Peak
Threshold line (red). This indicates what time stamps are considered as peak slots.
Figure 4.4 (bottom) depicts the demand curves of customer 1 and 2 during these peak
slots. The plot shows a clear explanation as to why customer 2 (orange) was the loser and
customer 1 (blue) was the winner. During the peak time slots, the demand of customer 1
far outstrips that of customer 2.
23
Figure 4.4: Examining Two Customers with Similar Old Bill but Different New Bill
4.6 Long-Term Characteristics: Average Demand for Each Hour
Of course, Figure 4.4 may have the propensity to be biased, running the risk of validating
the underlying methodology based on a very specific data slice. Let us mitigate that risk
by looking at a more general characteristics of the given data for the two customers and
the same system curve. In 4.5 (bottom), we see that the peak hours of system demand are
during hours 15 to 19. Comparing this to the Orange bars in 4.5 (top), which represents
Customer 2, it is clear that customer 2’s peaks coincide with that of the system. Customer
1 (blue) does increase a bit during the system peaks, however customer 1 is also quite well
distributed, consuming perhaps similar kWh as customer 2 but during off-peak hours, like
between hours 0-8. It therefore follows that customer 2 deserves to be the ’loser’ based on
this comparative analysis.
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Figure 4.5: Average Demand over the Full Time Period, computed for Each Hour
4.7 Comparative Study of the Two Customers’ Peak vs Non-Peak Behavior
To reinforce the previously obtained result, we take a close look at samples of the cus-
tomers’ data during the peak and non-peak conditions of the system. Consider the non-peak
time of 5AM - 6AM (4.6). If we zoom into the usage patterns, it is noted that the orange
curve is spikey (high variability) but not high magnitude for a long time. However, the blue
curve (customer 1, the winner) has a certain steady demand on the grid, which is on average
higher than that of the customer 2. But since this is an off-peak hour, neither customer is
penalized during this time, so one can say that customer 1 gets away with consuming more.
Similarly looking at the peak hour demand profiles (4.7), we see that customer 2 far
outstrips customer 1 in demand from the grid. Since this is a peak hour, the algorithm
definitely takes this activity into account, and so the customer 2 is attributed a heavier
weight compared to customer 1, thus ending up as the loser.
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Figure 4.6: Average Demand for the Two Customers at 5AM - 6AM: Illustrates Comparative
Behavior during Off-Peak System Conditions
Figure 4.7: Average Demand for the Two Customers at 7PM - 8PM: Illustrates the Com-
parative Behavior during Peak System Conditions
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4.8 Comparing the Old and New Billing Scheme for all Homes
Figures 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10 describe the effect of the new billing mechanism for each subset
of homes. This effect is quantified by evaluating the difference between the old bill and the
new bill, i.e. Boldi total−Bnewi total for each home. The distribution of this range has been plotted,
categorized based on the type of home: EV Homes, PV Homes, and non-DER Homes.
Figure 4.8: Difference between Old Bill − New Bill for Electric Vehicle Homes
4.8.1 Homes with EVs: Old vs New Billing Mechanism
In the case of EV homes, most homes have a positive value of Boldi total − Bnewi total. This
means that almost all homes have a lower bill in the new mechanism than they did in
the old mechanism. As a result, it seems that the new billing mechanism is favorable for
EVs. This follows intuition, because in the previous billing mechanism, all that mattered
for billing was how much kWh volume was consumed by the home. Whereas in the new
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billing algorithm, the "impact" of the user is calculated during the critical/peak time slots
of demand, where the distribution system is under the most stress. Thus, under the new
billing mechanism, there is great potential of ’smart scheduling’ of EV charging during the
non-peak conditions of the system, which could lead to significant savings in the monthly bill
of those homes. Thus, the interests of both the distribution utility and the user are aligned.
Figure 4.9: Difference between Old Bill − New Bill for Solar PV Homes
4.8.2 Homes with PVs: Old vs New Billing Mechanism
When we observe the trend for PV homes, most homes have a negative value of Boldi total−
Bnewi total, which means that almost all PV homes have a significant increase in their monthly
bill when evaluated under the new mechanism. While this observation seems to suggest
that the new mechanism is unfavorable to PVs, it can be argued that the new mechanism is
capturing the true costs of PV that were previously (unfairly) being borne by non-PV homes.
Despite the fact that the volume of consumption for PV homes is less, the sudden ramping
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of PV during the late evening causes significant strain on the distribution grid. This issue is
captured in the new billing scheme through the Variability impact factor V .
Figure 4.10: Difference between Old Bill − New Bill for Homes without DERs
4.8.3 Homes without DERs: Old vs New Billing Mechanism
Let us now consider the case of non-DER homes. Most homes have a positive Boldi total −
Bnewi total value. More specifically, of the 100 homes, almost 90 have a positive Boldi total−Bnewi total,
with 70 homes having a slightly positive value ($0-$10 increase in monthly bill). This indi-
cates that most non-DER homes are being benefited by the new billing mechanism. This
addresses one of the key drawbacks of the previous utility billing scheme, where in many
cases, costs incurred by the utilities in their PV-incentive programs such as net metering or
other subsidies would be recovered from the non-PV customers. With the new mechanism,
the trend of penalizing non-PV customers is reversed, bringing the distribution of bills back
to balance.
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4.9 Examining the effect of 25% Penetration of PV/EV on the New Billing
Mechanism
Figures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 describe the effect of Penetration of individual DERs (EV
and PV) on each subset of homes. In the default system, there is a DER penetration of 25%
EV and 25% PV (50 homes each). In the system without EV, the DER penetration is 0%
EV (0 homes) and 25% PV (50 homes). The first figure compares the bills of the EV Homes
calculated in the default system vs the system without EVs. The second figure is the same,
but for PV instead of EVs. The third figure shows a comparison of bills for non-DER homes
calculated in the default system vs a system with 0% DER Penetration, i.e. no EVs or PVs.
4.9.1 EV Homes: Performance under the New Billing Scheme with and without
EVs
When considering the effect of EV Penetration on EV homes, it is observed that most
homes have a positive difference between with and without EV, thus following the expected
trend of having higher electricity bills due to the presence of an EV. The few outliers which
have a reduced electric bill despite adopting an EV can be attributed to perhaps a decrease
in the variability index.
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Figure 4.11: Difference of Bill for EV Customers under New Scheme with and without EVs
4.9.2 PV Homes: Performance under the New Billing Scheme with and without
PVs
With PV however, the story is different. Some PV homes seem to benefit with the
introduction of PV (around 20 homes), but the rest have a higher bill with the introduction
of PV. One factor could be explained by the variability index V accounting for 25% of the
total revenue, and that the PV homes have the highest variability impact factors. Another
issue could be that PVs are pulling down the system conditions below peak threshold when
the sun is shining, and shifting peak slots to different times.
This leads to a very interesting thought: the application of solar+storage technology
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Figure 4.12: Difference of Bill for PV Customers under the New Scheme with and without
PVs
combined with smart scheduling for maximizing usage during system non-peak conditions
be the optimal strategy in the new billing scheme.
4.9.3 Non-DER Homes: Performance under the New Billing Scheme with and
without any DERs
Looking at the effect of DER penetration on non-DER homes, it is noted that every
single non-DER home has seen a reduction in their electric bills due to the penetration of
DER. While this seems like the new mechanism is deterring people from investing in DER,
it can be argued that this only occurs because PV homes are perhaps insufficiently rewarded
32
Figure 4.13: Difference of Bill for Non-DER Customers under the New Scheme with and
without DERs
for their contribution of reducing peak system demand. Solar+storage could far outperform
the existing solar-only model, thus significantly reducing the bill share of the PV homes,
which in turn would cause an increased bill for the non-DER homes.
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Critical Analysis of the New Grid Impact Factor Billing Mechanism
5.1.1 Pros
5.1.1.1 Revenue Decoupling
The mechanism introduced in this work effectively decouples utility revenue and customer
bills from volumetric consumption.
5.1.1.2 Recovers Utility Costs Accurately and Effectively
It is more representative of the true costs inflicted upon the distribution grid by the
customers, due to the usage of kW rather than kWh as a defining metric. The introduction
of ’Variability’ is also a novel approach.
5.1.1.3 Utility Revenue Targets are Assured to Be Met
A very important point to note is that the new mechanism has a prominent distinction
from the existing model - rather than expecting a total revenue for the utility depending on
several variables, the new mechanism affords the utility the opportunity to ensure a stable
and assured revenue. This is because the total target revenue is first set, and then the new
mechanism allocates the costs to all customers appropriately.
5.1.1.4 Eliminates Price Risk for End-Users
On the customer end, the TDU Charges in the bill is now a fixed monthly charge, thereby
eliminating price risk for customers. Also, any incentive program can now be deployed
much more effectively because of the fact that the key metrics based on which the bills are
calculated are much more correlated with the true causes for utility expenditure.
Thus it is clear that this mechanism offers clear benefits to both ends of the market.
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5.1.2 Cons
5.1.2.1 Peak Threshold Calculation Unfair to Solar PV?
As mentioned earlier, the introduction of PV could cause the total system conditions to
go below the peak threshold in some time slots, thus converting that time slot from a peak
slot to a non-peak slot. However, this also shifts the peak slots to a different time, because
of the fact that peak slots are defined on a percentile basis, rather than absolute. There will
always be a top 25% set of values; it does not matter whether that range is small or large.
As a result, the new system peak time slots would be those times when perhaps the sun
does not shine. The appliance usage of a PV home is not offset when the sun is not shining,
therefore these new shifted peak slots could be when the PV homes stop generating, and
demand power from the grid, thus contributing to increase in the system demand. These
slots are now the peak slots, and PV homes along with all other homes contribute to their
W and V impact factors significantly during this time. Thus, it could lead to the situation
where non-PV homes get away with ’bad’ usage patterns when the sun is shining, because
PV homes are generating enough power to reduce the stress on the system below the system
peak threshold. Essentially, some non-PV homes escape penalization due to their behavior
being covered or compensated for by the PV homes.
5.1.2.2 Total Target Revenue Assumption
One thing that must be kept in mind is that we are making an assumption that the new
billing scheme has the same total target revenue as the old. This assumption is made to
aid in comparative analysis of the two billing schemes. However, the assumption fails when
applying this to a real distribution system because of the very reason why a new billing
mechanism was required in the first place - the old billing mechanism does not capture the
true costs incurred by the system, thus the total revenue generated using the old billing
mechanism is not the best metric for the Total Target Revenue.
An issue connecting the Solar PV and Total Target Revenue is that, in case PV is
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introduced, the system has a lower demand when the sun is shining, thus reducing the total
system stress in this period. This would result in a reduction in overall system costs, thus
the total target revenue would reduce. This is not captured because of the assumption of
equal total target revenue between new and old schemes.
5.2 Challenges and Opportunities
The Grid-Edge Revolution will not take place unless all stakeholders are playing for the
same team. Another massive pillar of support needs to be the regulators. With regulatory
policies like Performance Incentive Mechanisms rewarding/penalizing utilities for various
metrics like System Efficiency, DER & Customer Engagement, Environmental Goals etc.,
the utilities definitely exercise much more control over their revenues, since it is now based
on their own performance. This creates a win-win situation where the utility now can focus
on improving and modernizing the grid infrastructure, thus enabling further penetration of
DER and grid-edge capabilities into the system.
This may be quite complicated for the ordinary consumer to handle, but if the focus is
to compensate all parties involved as accurately as possible while considering all the factors
involved, the complicated nature of rate design comes as no surprise. Maybe this could signal
the birth of a whole new industry of Grid-Edge Services; a power electronic converter offering
control intelligence at the grid-edge [25], or perhaps a "Grid Guru" who could automate and
manage a smart-homes energy usage according to its electric plan, while also handling peer-
to-peer energy transactions within a neighborhood. With the advent of grid edge technologies
and heavy penetration of EVs and DERs, the time is ripe for such ideas to come to fruition.
5.3 Summary
The primary objective of this work was to induce a philosophical shift to the way electric
utility business models have been operating. This fundamental shift from treating electricity
as a commodity to treating it as a service has been developed into a concrete rate calculation
mechanism, providing an alternative to the existing business model with several advantageous
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features.
With the introduction of metrics such as peak thresholds and % Allocation, the utility
has far greater flexibility to modify the billing mechanism as per the true costs they incur.
The previous billing scheme had some clear losers - the utility company, because their
total revenue was not an assured number, as well as some non-PV users, who were being
unfairly charged to finance subsidies for PV homes. With the new system, it can be argued
that almost everyone is a winner, except PV users, however their fortune could be completely
different if they had solar + storage.
5.4 Further Study
Future work will have to answer some key questions: the effect of solar+storage could
be transformative, and thus needs to be tested. Also, further insight needs to be gained on
how to calculate the actual Total Target Revenue, such that it recovers the costs incurred by
utilities under different system conditions. The right method to evaluate the peak threshold
remains a difficult question; multiple designs must be tested on real user data to assess which
approach would most align with the objectives of this novel customer billing mechanism for
efficient and accurate distribution utility cost recovery. A key area that could be explored
based on this framework would be the opportunity for Value-Added Grid Services, such as
Demand Response, and DER Scheduling to name a few.
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